We examine an economy with n production sectors that interact via a production externality. We nd a solution to the resulting dynamic di erential game between sectors and compare it to the cooperative solution. As the number of sectors increases, the limiting policy is the optimal policy without a production externality. This policy is ine cient and, depending on the sign of the externality b e t ween sectors, the ine ciency is due to over-(or under-) consumption.
Introduction
The object of this paper is to examine the dynamics of growth and the optimal investment policies in a model with several sectors, where an externality is partially internalized, in contrast to the usual assumption of no internalization. In our model of an economy, the output of each sector in uences the output of the other sectors. As an example, external e ects due to spillovers from education or innovation in one sector have a positive e ect on the other sectors of the economy. On the other hand, there could be negative external e ects due to, say, pollution. Each sector in the model is assumed to maximize its own utility. We assume that the e ect of the output of other sectors cannot be altered by the actions of the a ected sector since output decisions are taken noncooperatively. Hence, this model is studied in the context of a di erential game in which the externalities are only partially internalized be each of the sectors. The Nash equilibrium of the game is therefore ine cient.
Our rst task is to reformulate the model of Fischer and Mirman 3], in which the original di erential game with this type of externality is analyzed, as a model of the choice of sectoral-speci c labor input in an economy with n sectors. This formulation is more general than the usual dynamic economic model and it is consistent with the models used in the literature on endogenous growth (Romer 1]). We then specialize the model so that the production function is Cobb-Douglas and the objective function is logarithmic. This is done in order to make the model tractable while retaining the most important features of the general model. In fact, we are able to get closed form solutions to the resulting di erential game between 82 sectors. It is then easy to make comparisons between the cooperative and the noncooperative solutions.
This formulation also allows us to study other questions. In particular, we study the convergence of the noncooperative solution as the number of sectors increases. In this way we can study the e ect of the externality on the optimal (noncooperative) policy of each sector. The major result of the paper is to show that, as the number of sectors grows, so that the in uence of any speci c sector plays an increasingly smaller role on the other sectors, the noncooperative policy converges. The limiting policy is the optimal cooperative policy in the shing model of Levhari and Mirman 4] , where there are no production externalities. This limiting policy is not, however, the optimal policy, w h i c h w ould have to account explicitly for the externalities. In other words, the externality should have been internalized and not ignored. Hence, we s h o w t h a t the limiting policy is ine cient i n this growth model with externalities. Moreover, the convergence of policies is monotonous, in the sense that the non-cooperative policy becomes increasingly ine cient as the number of sectors grows.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: the next section discusses the general di erential game with production the third section specializes the general model of our speci c formulation, the fourth section contains the main results of the paper, and the nal section concludes.
The General Problem
Consider a world with only n industrial sectors, each endowed with a certain amount of labor per period (we normalize the endowment of labor to one in each industry).
In period t industry i i = 1 : : : n , owns stocks of capital x it . When this stock o f capital is combined with sector-speci c labor the industry obtains sector-speci c e ective labor. In this sense, capital ampli es the productivity o f r a w labor. E ective labor is used to produce consumption and capital goods. If industry i assigns a fraction l it of its labor time to the production of consumption goods, it obtains c it = h i (l it x it ) l it 2 0 1] i = 1 : : : n :
There is an alternative use of labor time. In each sector, capital is created by investing a fraction of labor time. The production function for each t ype of capital is given by:
x it+1 = f(x it l it x ;it l ;it ) i = 1 : : : n :
where for any v ector v 2 < n we de ne v ;i (v 1 : : human capital, it might re ect the e ect of a higher level of average education on the acquisition of additional education, or it might correspond to the notion that discoveries, inventions and ideas from one sector may be found useful in other areas. 1 Each sector consumes the good it produces. We assume that industry 1 chooses the assignment of labor to consumption and investment by solving the following general dynamic programming problem:
x it+1 = f(x it l it x ;it l ;it ) l it 2 0 1]
There are major di culties in analyzing this problem, since in this general form it is not even known whether there is a solution (see Fischer and Mirman 3] ). In order to obtain an understanding of the e ects at play, in the next section we proceed to examine an example that can be solved explicitly, but which w e believe captures most of the important features of the general model.
The Main Example
In this section we examine a particular speci cation of the production and utility functions. The following functional forms for utility and production allow for an explicit solution of the dynamic programming problems (3) . Suppose production of the consumption good is c it = ( 1 ; l it )x it l it 2 0 1] i = 1 : : : n :
while production of human capital is given by x it+1 = ( x it + l it x it ) 2 4 Y j6 =i ( x jt + l jt x jt ) =(n;1) 3 5 j j 1 i = 1 : : : n :
This is a natural extension of the \ sh production" models of Fischer and Mirman 3] to the case of a symmetric model of many i n teracting sectors in a standard production economy. 2 In the production function, x it corresponds to depreciated capital and l it x it is the investment in capital stock in period t in sector i. The external e ects caused by the capital stocks of the other sectors act through the term in brackets.
Using Bellman's principle for the value function (3) and the speci c functional forms above, we can rewrite the value function to obtain the maximization problem facing each sector: In what follows, we assume that these value functions are nite. 3 
Noncooperation
In this section we follow the methodology of Fischer and Mirman 3] to obtain an explicit solution to the optimization problem of each industry and use it to show that as the number of sectors grows, the solution approaches the optimal solution when there are no externalities. Before proving our main result, we obtain an explicit solution to the n sector model in the following lemma: from which w e obtain the value for given in (7) by replacing the value of A and B in the previous expression and solving.
For example, in the case n = 2 , w e recover a solution that is analogous to the one obtained by F i s c her and Mirman 3], for a production technology: i = ( 1 + ) (1 ; ) ; 
We use this lemma to prove the main result of the paper.
Proposition 1 A symmetric, stationary solution to the dynamic game described by (6) exists and as the number of sectors increases, the fraction of labor allocated to consumption approaches the optimal (cooperative) solution when there are no externalities, i = ( 1 + )(1 ; ) i = 1 : : : n :
Proof: Taking the limit as n ! 1 in the expression for obtained in (7) we get the desired result. The rst thing to note about this result is that the consumption rule given in the proposition is analogous to the one obtained by Levhari and Mirman 4] for the cooperative {i.e., optimal{ solution in a case of no externality. That solution is not e cient here, since it does not consider the existence of the production externality. 86 
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This proposition extends to a dynamic game the results that obtain in a one shot game with external e ects: as the number of sectors grows with no bounds, we arrive at the problem of the commons.
It is interesting to compare the solution to the non-cooperative problem with the cooperative solution obtained when the planner maximizes collective w elfare. Using the same techniques as those used to derive proposition 1, it is easy to show t h a t c , the proportion of raw labor that is devoted to consumption is: 6 c = ( 1 + )(1 ; ; ) (9)
If we compare the cooperative to the non-cooperative solution as the number of sectors increases, we h a ve that the di erence is: c i ; i = ( 1 + ) (1 ; ; )(n ; 1) (1 ; ; 2 ) ; n(1 ; ; )
and we have sgn( c i ; i ) = ;sgn( ). Moreover, the extent of the ine ciency increases with the number of sectors, n. In the limit when n ! 1, ( c i ; i ) = ; (1 + ). What these expressions are telling us is that if the externalities are positive, as in the case of knowledge spillovers between sectors, the non-cooperative consumption rate is too high. On the other hand, if the externality is negative, as in the case of pollution between sectors, the non-cooperative consumption rate is too low. Moreover, the convergence to the limiting policy is monotonous, in the sense of more ine ciency as the number of sectors increases.
Conclusions
This paper has examined the dynamics of growth in a production model with n sectors that generate externalities that a ect the other sectors. We have found a solution to the dynamic non-cooperative game between the di erent industrial sectors. The comparison between this solution and the optimal cooperative solution shows that the allocation of resources to investment is ine cient and that the ine ciency is due to lack (excess) of investment when the interactions are positive (negative).
The main result of this paper is derived from an examination of the solution of the game as the number of sectors increases. We nd the limiting policy, which replicates the optimal policy when there are no production externalities. The limiting policy is hence ine cient and the over-(or under-) consumption which is the source of the ine ciency depends on the sign of the externality between sectors. In other words, the behavior of each sector approaches the behavior of an industry which has no (or which i s n o t a ware of) interactions with other industries, i.e., the usual assumption in endogenous growth models.
It is interesting to note that the model can also be interpreted as a world of many c o u n tries whose economies interact only through externalities such as crossboundary pollution or through the di usion of knowledge.
